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Abstract 
We investigate the impact of son preferences in India on gender inequalities in educational performance and 
investment. Son preferences can create gender inequalities through two channels: preferential treatment of 
boys within the families and gender-biased fertility strategies (gender-specific fertility stopping rules and 
sex-selective abortions). We distinguish the impact of direct favoritism towards sons in general and towards 
eldest sons from the impact of fertility strategies. Our empirical strategy relies on dividing families based 
on the gender of the first-born, and employing family fixed effects. In short, our results suggest strong 
favoritism towards boys in general. In comparison to the advantage that boys have over girls within the 
family, the extra advantage of the eldest son is small and only statistically significant for pecuniary 
investment. The advantage of boys over girls within the family that can be attributed to gender-biased 
fertility strategies is also small in comparison to the advantage that can be attributed to favoritism of sons. 
We further document systematic differences between the families that girls and boys live in due to gender-
biased fertility strategies, with implications for education investment and performance. Again, the resulting 
gender inequalities are smaller than the inequalities due to families’ favoritism of sons over daughters. 
Regardless of the reason behind favoritism, the consequence is inequality of opportunities between girls and 
boys.  
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1. Introduction 
Son preferences influence a wide range of behaviors in India. This is not the least apparent in the 
skewed sex ratios and the large number of missing girls and women (Sen, 1992; Clark, 2000; 
Klasen & Wink, 2002; Jha et al., 2006; Anderson & Ray, 2010; Milazzo, 2018). Studies have also 
documented unequal health investments between girls/women and boys/men (Arnold et al., 1998; 
Mishra et al., 2004; Jayachandran & Kuziemko, 2011; Dercon & Singh, 2013; Barcellos et al., 
2014),  as well as gender gaps in education investment within families (Azam and Kingdon, 2013; 
Kaul 2018).  
In this paper, we investigate the impact of son preferences in India on gender inequalities in 
education investment and performance. While it is easy to imagine that son preferences should 
translate into unequal investments in girls compared to boys, it is less clear exactly through which 
channels this occurs. Gender gaps could result from within-household favoritism, but also from 
strategies that parents employ to have sons. One such strategy is to continue having children until 
the birth of a son, i.e. gender-specific fertility stopping. In families without boys, the birth of an 
additional girl increases the expected family size, thereby reducing the resources available for her 
(Jayachandran and Pande, 2017). In particular, parents’ decision to continue childbearing and their 
decision on how soon they try to have another child will create inequalities between girls and boys 
in early-childhood investments, which has potential consequences for education performance and 
investment later in life. Jensen (2003) show how gender-specific fertility stopping leads to girls 
living in larger families than boys, and how this can create inequalities in education investment 
even if girls and boys were treated equally within families. The combination of gender-specific 
fertility stopping and favoritism towards sons could also create within-family gender inequalities. 
Families that would not favor sons over daughters for their preferred family size might do so if the 
family exceeds the preferred family size, such that credit-constraints become more binding.  
The other strategy is sex-selective abortions.1 It has been suggested that sex-selective abortions 
should reduce gender inequalities since girls will more often be born into families that actually 
                                                          
1 Other possible strategies are infanticide and abandonment (Jeffery et al., 1984; Miller, 1987; Sudha and Rajan 
1999), but these are likely to be less prevalent.  
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want them (Goodkind, 1996; Anukriti et al, 2016).2 However, high SES families tend to have 
stronger son preferences (Edlund, 1999; Borker et al., 2017)3 and are likely to desire fewer children, 
which will increase the use of sex-selective abortions if parents are keen to have at least one son 
(Chakraborty and Kim, 2010; Bhalotra and Cochrane, 2010). Therefore, sex selection is likely to 
exacerbate between family inequalities between boys and girls. We will refer to gender-specific 
fertility stopping rules and sex-selective abortions broadly as gender-biased fertility strategies. 
Whether gender inequalities are primarily due to favoritism towards sons or fertility strategies 
matters for the impact of different policy measures or courses of events on education gender 
inequalities.  
In addition to possibly creating gender inequalities, the existence of gender-biased fertility 
strategies complicate the estimation of within-family favoritism. This is because gender cannot be 
treated as exogenous anymore. Note that it is not enough to employ family fixed-effects to deal 
with selection of gender in this case. Gender is endogenous within the family.  
In our investigation of the impact of son preferences on gender inequalities, we distinguish the 
impact of direct favoritism towards sons in general from favoritism towards the eldest sons. We 
also distinguish the impact of favoritism from the impact of gender-biased fertility strategies. 
Favoritism by definition occurs within families, while gender-biased fertility strategies could create 
inequalities both within and between families. We use a wide range of education indicators, 
including indicators of performance (completed grades and test scores) as well as of time 
investment (enrollment and hours spent on school) and pecuniary investment (the private-public 
school choice and education expenditure). In addition, we estimate the impact on height-for-age, 
which is a potential link between inequalities in early-life environment and investment and later-
                                                          
2 To the extent that sex-selection and gender-specific fertility stopping rules are alternative strategies to ensure a son, 
availability of sex-selection could also decrease within-household inequalities, by crowding out gender-specific 
fertility stopping. 
3 Sex-selective abortions are more common among high caste families and well-off urban families than among 
economically disadvantaged and rural families (Chakraborty and Kim, 2010; Bhalotra and Cochrane, 2010). There 
can be many underlying reasons behind this. One is that better-off families have stronger reasons to want sons. 
Edlund (1999) shows that this will be the case if families care about marriage of their children. The skewed sex ratios 
resulting from sex-selective abortions and excessive mortality among girls makes men the abundant sex on marriage 
markets. High status men can still expect to get married, while low status men might end up single. For high SES 
families the choice is thus between a married daughter and a married son, while for low SES families the choice is 
rather between a married daughter and a potentially unmarried son. This gives low SES families less incentives to 
abort girls. There could also be differences in availability and affordability of sex-selective abortions, even though it 
appears to be widely available and cheap (Bhalotra and Cochrane, 2010). 
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life education outcomes. This is interesting since the earlier literature documents implications of 
gender-biased fertility strategies on early-life investments. Parents who aim for a son after the birth 
of a girl might for example invest less in her to save resources for the son they hope to have, or 
mothers might breastfeed shorter to try to get pregnant with a son (Barcellos et al., 2014; 
Jayachandran and Pande, 2017). 
In short, our results suggest strong favoritism towards boys in general within families. In 
comparison to the within-family advantage that boys have over girls, the extra advantage of the 
eldest son is mostly small and statistically insignificant. However, eldest sons are favored over and 
above the advantage they have because of their gender and birth order for pecuniary investment. 
Gender-biased fertility strategies do not appear to drive within-household gender inequalities to a 
large extent. Perhaps surprisingly, given the literature on the impact of gender-specific fertility 
stopping on early life health investments, we do not find impacts on height-for-age among school 
age children. Gender-biased fertility strategies cause systematic differences in the types of families 
where girls live compared to the types of families where boys live. While we are not able to exactly 
quantify the implied education inequalities between boys and girls, we can estimate a lower bound. 
Though not negligible, these inequalities are smaller than those due to within-family favoritism of 
sons.  
Our estimation strategy relies on both division of families into those with first-born girls and those 
with first-born boys and on family fixed effects. The division of families into those with first-born 
girls and those with first-born boys serves to distinguish between families that might use gender-
biased fertility strategies from families that should not. Since sex-selection is not common for first 
births (Pörtner, 2013; Rosenblum, 2015, 2017), gender of the first-born can be considered random. 
However, the gender of the first-born has important consequences for the use of gender-biased 
fertility strategies. To ensure the birth of a son, families with a first-born girl might use either sex-
selective abortions or gender-specific fertility stopping. Families with a first-born son have less 
reason to use such strategies. In short, we will treat gender of the first birth as exogenous and we 
will treat gender of all children as exogenous in the families with first-born boys. We will also use 
first-born boys’ families as the counterfactual without gender-biased fertility strategies when we 
estimate the impact of these strategies.  
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Family fixed effects are crucial, but not enough, to estimate within-family favoritism. They will 
control for eventual family size, which is by necessity correlated with birth order, and in the Indian 
case also correlated with gender (Jensen, 2003). Since we observe families before many have 
completed childbearing and in general do not know which families have and have not completed 
childbearing, family fixed effects is the only way to fully control for eventual family size.  
Our analysis proceeds in four steps. First, to estimate favoritism towards sons in general we use 
the sample of families with first-born boys. The estimated gender effect in this sample should not 
be affected by gender-biased fertility strategies. Since the first-born boy himself could be special, 
we compare later born boys in these families to later born girls, controlling for birth order.  
Second, we estimate favoritism towards the eldest son, who in the earlier literature has been 
suggested to be particularly advantaged.4 Favoritism towards boys may be targeted to eldest sons 
in particular, rather than towards sons in general.  (Jayachandran and Pande, 2017; Kaul, 2018). 
We do so in a very straightforward way, by adding an eldest son dummy to a within-family 
estimation that also controls for both gender and birth order. In spite of the simplicity of this 
approach, we are to the best of our knowledge the first to use it in a model that fully accounts for 
birth order.5  
Third, to estimate within-family gender inequalities that are due to gender-biased fertility strategies 
we compare the first-born girls and the first-born boys’ samples. We essentially use a difference-
in-difference strategy where first-born boys’ families are used as the counterfactual without gender-
biased fertility strategies and first-born girls’ families are the “treated” group who might resort to 
gender-biased fertility strategies. The interaction term between first-born girl family and gender 
reveal if girls fare worse in the families that might resort to gender-biased fertility than in the 
families that do not.  
Fourth, we investigate between-family inequalities due to fertility strategies. If boys are born into 
high SES families and girls into low SES families that also end up having more children, there 
should be implications for aggregate human capital investment into girls and into boys. To 
                                                          
4 The desire of parents to have at least one son might be related to the role of the eldest son in providing for them in 
old age, taking over family land, and performing important rituals (Mullatti, 1995; Jayachandran and Pande, 2017). 
5 Kaul 2018 uses an eldest son dummy and controls for gender and being first born. However, conditional on not 
being first born, being the eldest son is still correlated with a lower birth order.  
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investigate if this is the case, we again compare the first-born girls’ and the first-born boys’ 
families. We first test whether there are systematic differences in the first-born girls’ families 
regarding where subsequent girls end up in comparison to those where subsequent boys end up. 
Next, we estimate the consequence of the inferred difference between boys’ families and girls’ 
families for educational investment and outcomes. Since there can be additional differences 
between girls’ and boys’ families these will be lower bounds.  
We contribute to the literature on son preferences in several ways. This literature has mostly 
considered early-life outcomes and/or survival of females versus males (Sen, 1992; Clark, 2000; 
Klasen & Wink, 2002; Jha et al., 2006; Anderson & Ray, 2010; Milazzo, 2018; Arnold et al., 1998; 
Mishra et al., 2004; Jayachandran & Kuziemko, 2011; Dercon & Singh, 2013; Barecello et al., 
2014; Jayachandran & Pande, 2017). Education investment and outcomes has received less 
attention. While there are papers documenting gender gaps (Azam and Kingdon, 2013; Kaul 2018), 
these typically do not explain the connection to son preferences and gender-biased fertility 
strategies. The seminal paper by Jensen (2003) showed that gender-specific fertility stopping could 
and did create gender inequalities even for a subset of families treating girls and boys equally. We 
extend the analysis of Jensen (2003) by analyzing more recent data, when sex-selective abortions 
were widely available and fertility rates were much lower. The impact of gender-biased fertility 
strategies should be different in this changed context. We also use a different strategy to identify 
gender inequalities that are due to different sources: within-household discrimination, within-
household inequalities due to gender-biased fertility strategies, and between household inequalities 
due to gender-biased fertility strategies. Moreover, we look at a wide range of education indicators.  
As pointed out by Edlund (1999), the more frequent use of sex-selective abortions in high compared 
to low SES families implies that girls and boys are born into different families, thus potentially 
creating a female under-class. The combination of sex-selective abortions and gender-specific 
fertility stopping could create large differences in the types of families that girls and boys live in. 
We investigate this, and the implications thereof on education investment and outcomes.  
We contribute to the literature that estimate gender gaps in education. In this literature, within-
family gender gaps are typically interpreted as favoritism (Kingdon & Azam, 2013; Kaul, 2018) 
However, gender-biased fertility strategies imply that gender cannot be treated as exogenous in the 
Indian context. Moreover, family fixed effects, which is the strategy typically employed in the 
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literature, is not enough to deal with endogeneity of gender. Within family gender gaps do not only 
reflect within-family favoritism of the boys, but are also influenced by gender-biased fertility 
strategies. We contribute to the literature by estimation of a within-household gender effect that 
can be interpreted causally.  
Several authors suggest strong preferences for at least one son and favoritism of the eldest son 
rather than sons in general in India (Rosenblum, 2013; Jayachandran, 2017; Jayachandran and 
Pande, 2017; Kaul, 2018). Kaul (2018) uses a within-family model with a control for being the 
first-born child and finds that eldest sons (who can be of different birth order) face an advantage in 
enrollment and educational expenditure. We extend that analysis by controlling for the birth order 
of later-born children in the family in addition to a control for being the first-born. This is important 
given the systematic difference in the birth order of eldest sons in families where the first-born is 
a boy (where the eldest son is always the first-born child) versus families where the first-born is a 
girl (where the eldest son is never the first-born child). It is also important given that the latter 
family type is more likely to resort to gender-biased fertility strategies. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in section 2 we describe the data and present 
total gender inequalities and evidence of gender-biased fertility strategies, while in section 3 we 
present the empirical strategy. In section 4 we present the empirical results, and section 5 concludes 
the paper. 
2. Data and descriptive patterns 
2.1 Data and variables 
The data comes from two rounds of the India Human Development Survey (IHDS), collected in 
2004-05 and 2011-12. This is a nationally representative survey of over 40000 households in 
India.6 We use birth histories of women age 15 to 49 to create a sample of full siblings.7 The sample 
includes cases where there is more than one sibship per household, as there are cases of extended 
families living in the same household. Multiple birth children (twins, triplets) are excluded from 
                                                          
6The data has been collected jointly by the University of Maryland in the United States and the National Council of 
Applied Economic Research in India. The surveys were administered via interviews conducted in the local language, 
and cover a wide variety of socioeconomic topics.  
7 We restrict the sample to families where both the mothers and their husbands have not been previously married. 
Divorce is very unusual in India, and only 3.9% of children have one or two previously married parents.  
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the analysis, since their birth order is not well-defined. We use household weights from the first 
round to account for the fact that there is some oversampling of certain groups in the data. 
Our main estimation sample is children aged 6 to 17; however, test scores are only available for 
children age 8-11, and height-for-age is mostly available for children age 8-11. For a sibship to be 
included in the estimation sample there needs to be non-missing data from at least two children. 
Often there is data on more than one child from each of the two surveys. Sibships are also included 
if there is data from one child in the first round and another child in the second round.8 For the 
outcomes where age ranges from 6 – 17, there are on average about 3 children per sibship. For the 
outcomes where the age range is 8 – 11, there are on average just over 2 children per sibship in the 
sample. 
Our main explanatory variable of interest is gender. We create a dummy variable female that takes 
a value of one if the child is a girl, and zero otherwise. We also control for absolute birth order, 
using dummy variables for birth orders one, two, three and four plus,9 for age using age dummies, 
and for survey year. 
A particular strength of the data set is that it allows us to analyze an unusually rich set of educational 
variables. We can broadly categorize our dependent variables into educational performance of the 
child and educational investment. The indicators of child performance are the test scores on 
reading, writing and mathematics and the number of completed grades.10 We use standardized test 
scores such that they measure age-specific standard deviations from the mean, using the sample 
population as the age-specific reference. 11,12  
The indicators of educational investment are Enrollment, Total hours, Private school and School 
expenses. The first two are indicators of time invested in schooling. Enrollment is a dummy 
                                                          
8 This substantially increases the test scores estimation sample. 
9 Birth order 4 plus takes a value of one if the child’s birth order is 4 or higher and zero otherwise. 
10 The tests are administered by the interviewers. 
11 The reading score runs from 0 (cannot read) to 4 (read a story), with the intermediate values 1 (letter), 2 (word) 
and 3 (paragraph). The writing score is equal to 0 if the child cannot write and 1 if the child can write with 2 or less 
mistakes. The math score runs between 0 (cannot count) and 3 (division), with the intermediate values 1 (number) 
and 2 (subtraction). 
12 The test scores variables are the same as Makino (2012) uses in her analysis. We have an additional round of data 
from 2010-11 and thus have a much larger sample of families with at least two children in the data. This allows us to 
rely on a within-sibship analysis. 
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variables taking a value of 1 if the child is enrolled in school and zero otherwise. 13 Total hours 
combines all hours related to schooling, including the hours in school, hours of homework and 
hours of private tuition per week used by the child.14 In our regressions, we set Total hours to zero 
for all children who are not enrolled and estimate on the full sample. 
We include two measures of investment into school quality: Private school and School expenses.15 
These outcomes are only collected for children who are enrolled in school 16 Private school is a 
dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the child attends a private school, and 0 if the child attends 
a public school. School expenses measures the cost of school fees, books, uniforms, bus fare and 
private tuition fees in rupees. 
In addition to education indicators, we use the height-for-age z-score (HAZ). HAZ is relevant since 
it is a measure that will capture differences in early life investment and environment (Silventoinen, 
2003; Li et al., 2003), and since gender-biased fertility strategies have been found to matter for 
early life investment. HAZ has been shown to be correlated with both health human capital and 
cognitive and non-cognitive skills (Glewwe et al., 2001; Alderman et al., 2001). The HAZ was 
constructed using the WHO reference tables from 2007. The height data is available for all ages, 
but was collected with a primary focus on children under 5 and between the ages 8 to 11, with other 
ages included based on availability at the time of the survey.  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean Std dev Min Max 
Dependent variables      
Enrollment 69,523 0.848 0.359 0 1 
Total hours spent on school in a week 63,064 35.400 19.661 0 216 
Private school 55,620 0.266 0.442 0 1 
School expenses in rupees 49,962 2587.703 5281.526 0 201000 
Completed grades 69,514 4.500 3.203 0 16 
Reading test score 8,578 2.371 1.408 0 4 
Writing test score 8,478 0.663 0.473 0 1 
Math test score 8,545 1.387 1.007 0 3 
Height for age Z score 31,002 -1.842 1.452 -5.999 5.855 
                                                          
13 While it is possible that children are enrolled without actually attending school, less than 1% of our enrolled 
sample report spending zero hours on schooling, and approximately 90% report spending at least 29 hours a week on 
schooling. 
14 Private tuition depends on pecuniary investment, but we still choose to include it to count all hours equally. If 
children did not study with private tutors they could instead study alone or with someone else.  
15 Though the effect of these investments on human capital accumulation remain unclear, parents are likely to make 
them with the intent to improve the child’s human capital.  
16 Note that this, for example, implies that a family is dropped if only one child has attended school, even if there are 
more children of the right ages in the data.  
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Birth order 1 69,523 0.273 0.445 0 1 
Birth order 2 69,523 0.327 0.469 0 1 
Birth order 3 69,523 0.207 0.405 0 1 
Birth order 4 or higher 69,523 0.194 0.395 0 1 
Age 6 69,523 0.078 0.269 0 1 
Age 7 69,523 0.085 0.279 0 1 
Age 8 69,523 0.079 0.270 0 1 
Age 9 69,523 0.069 0.254 0 1 
Age 10 69,523 0.107 0.309 0 1 
Age 11 69,523 0.071 0.256 0 1 
Age 12 69,523 0.117 0.322 0 1 
Age 13 69,523 0.091 0.288 0 1 
Age 14 69,523 0.092 0.289 0 1 
Age 15 69,523 0.081 0.272 0 1 
Age 16 69,523 0.069 0.254 0 1 
Age 17 69,523 0.061 0.239 0 1 
Girl 69,523 0.484 0.500 0 1 
In first-born girl family 69,523 0.523 0.499 0 1 
Year 2011 69,523 0.473 0.499 0 1 
Household variables (Part 4.D)      
Poor 24,692 0.254 0.435 0 1 
Urban 24,692 0.282 0.450 0 1 
Mother’s ed 24,692 4.074 4.570 0 16 
Father’s ed 24,692 6.380 4.827 0 16 
SC/ST 24,692 0.302 0.459 0 1 
OBC 24,692 0.424 0.494 0 1 
Brahmin 24,692 0.045 0.207 0 1 
Muslim 24,692 0.125 0.331 0 1 
Sibship size 24,692 3.101 1.238 2 13 
Ideal no. kids 24,692 2.568 0.930 0 18 
 
Descriptive statistics on all variables used in our analysis are presented in Table 1. Enrollment is 
rather high, at about 85%. The average height-for-age Z score is approximately -1.84. Though this 
is very low, and quite close to the limit for stunting, it is in line with earlier findings from India 
(Tarozzi, 2008). 
2.2 The total education gender gap 
To know whether within-family favoritism and gender-biased fertility strategies are important 
explanations of education inequalities we need a benchmark for comparison. Table 2 shows the 
correlations between gender and education outcomes from regressions that do not use family fixed 
effects and that do not distinguish between families with first-born boys and families with first-
born girls. Note that these total inequalities are used merely as a benchmark. In particular, we will 
not decompose the total inequalities into different components. Our aim is to test the importance 
of various possible sources of gender inequalities, focusing on credible identification of the 
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mechanisms. This implies that we will not consider all sources behind the total gender inequalities. 
For example, we do not estimate the difference in outcomes between first-born girls and first-born 
boys. While gender of the first-born can be treated as exogenous, we still cannot tell if differences 
in outcomes are because first-born boys are treated different from first-born girls, or because first-
born girl families use gender-biased fertility strategies while first-born boy families do not. Another 
source of between-family variation that we do not consider is how total human capital investment 
in the family respond to child gender.  
Table 2: The total gender inequalities in education - descriptive regressions 
 Completed 
grades 
Reading Writing Math HAZ 
Female  -0.054** -0.129*** -0.133*** -0.208*** -0.123*** 
N 69,514 8,578 8,478 8,545 31,002 
 Enrolled Total hours Private Expenses  
Female -0.034*** -1.886*** -0.048*** -447.343***  
N 69,523 63,064 55,620 49,962  
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, and a year dummy. 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
 
Girls exhibit a disadvantage compared to boys for all outcomes. Both the reading and the writing 
test scores are about 0.13 age specific standard deviations lower for girls than for boys, while the 
math test score is about 0.21 lower. Girls’ HAZ is about 0.12 lower than boys’ are. On average 
girls are 3.4 percentage points less likely than boys to be enrolled (the mean is 0.848), and they 
spend 1.9 hours less every week on their schooling (the mean is 35.4). If enrolled, girls are 4.8 
percentage points less likely to be in a private school (the mean is 26.6 percent) and families 
spent 447.34 rupees less on their education (the mean is 2587.7 rupees). 
2.2 Evidence on gender-biased fertility strategies in the data 
There is clear evidence of gender-biased fertility strategies when looking at the number of females 
relative to males by birth order. When the sample is split between children who are the last-born in 
the family and those who are not, a striking pattern emerges. As can be seen in Figure 1, the number 
of girls per 1000 boys who are not the last-born is dramatically larger than the number of girls per 
1000 boys who are the last-born, particularly at birth orders 2 and 3. This could be either because 
parents use sex selective abortions before the birth of their last child or because parents continue 
11 
 
childbearing if they have a girl. Since we do not observe completed fertility of the mothers these 
numbers are likely to under-estimate true differences. Some last-born girls might not end up being 
last born.   
 
Figure 1: Ratio of boys to girls, by birth order 
Our empirical strategy assumes that gender of the first-born is random. As can be seen in Figure 1 
above, the sex ratio for all first-born children is 1.05, which is well within the range that is 
considered biologically normal (Anderson and Ray, 2010)17. Rosenblum (2017) tests for 
systematic differences in family characteristics that should be exogenous to the gender of the first-
born child using the first round of the India Human Development Survey (IHDS), and finds no 
significant evidence of sex-selection. As we are using both the first and second round of the IHDS, 
we do similar tests for evidence of sex-selection among first-born children also in the data from 
the second round. We test for systematic differences in the following family characteristics that 
should be exogenous to the gender of the first-born child: parental age and education, caste, 
religion, and whether they live in an urban or rural location. The results are presented in table A1 
in the appendix, and show essentially no significant differences between families with first-born 
girls versus families with first-born boys18. Hence, the gender of the first-born can be considered 
                                                          
17 The biologically normal rate is 106. 
18 There is a weakly significant difference in father’s age between first-born girls’ and first-born boys’ families, with 
fathers in first-born girls’ families being on average 0.3 years older. 
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random and there should be no a priori systematic selection into families that have a first-born girl 
versus a first-born boy. 
Even if first-born girls do not appear to end up in systematically different families than first-born 
boys, it is clear from the data that this does not apply to girls and boys in general. Gender-biased 
fertility strategies imply that girls and boys live in systematically different families: girls have on 
average significantly more siblings, are significantly more likely to be in a household that is below 
the poverty line, and are more likely to belong to a lower caste. The pattern is the same for children 
in families where the first-born is a girl.  
Table 3: Differences in means, children up to age 17. 
 Female Male  
 N Mean N Mean diff 
Sibship size 54,861 3.43 59,980 3.22 0.21*** 
Income per capita 54,065 11455 59,080 12062.96 -607.96*** 
Poor 54,813 0.302 59,901 0.276 0.026*** 
Ideal number of sons 48,708 1.51 52,720 1.54 -0.03*** 
SC/ST 54,402 0.32 59,481 0.31 0.007* 
 First born girl family First born boy family  
 N Mean N Mean diff 
Sibship size 59,673 3.46 55,168 3.16 0.30*** 
Income pc 58,742 11574.85 54,403 11981.51 -406.66*** 
Poor 59,612 0.29 55,102 0.28 0.01*** 
Ideal number of sons 52,969 1.50 48,459 1.55 -0.05*** 
SC/ST 59,165 0.32 54,718 0.31 0.005 
 Not last-born 
L b  
Last-born  
 N Mean N Mean diff 
Birth order 1 - %female 29,800 0.50 8,070 0.45 0.05*** 
Birth order 2 - %female 19,099 0.53 16,764 0.41 0.12*** 
Birth order 3 - %female 9,667 0.56 11,502 0.42 0.14*** 
Birth order 4+ - %female 9,036 0.53 10,903 0.42 0.11*** 
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
To investigate the impact of son preferences on human capital inequalities we combine two main 
strategies. First, we identify families with first-born boys and those with first-born girls. The gender 
of the first-born should be largely exogenous in India despite sex-selective abortions since these 
are not common before the birth of the first child (Bhalotra and Cochrane 2010; Jha et al. 2011; 
Pörtner, 2015; Rosenblum, 2015, 2017). In the previous section, we confirmed that this holds in 
our data.  However, as also indicated in the previous section investigating patterns in our data, the 
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gender of the first-born leads to important differences between the families. Families with first-
born boys have less reason to use either gender-specific fertility stopping rules or sex-selective 
abortions. This can be exploited in two important ways to learn about the mechanisms though 
which son preferences create gender inequalities. First, gender should be random also for later birth 
orders in the first-born boy sample, implying that the gender coefficient can be interpreted 
causally.19 Second, we can compare families with first-born boys to families with first-born girls 
to find the impact of gender-biased fertility strategies on gender inequalities.  
Our second main strategy is to employ family fixed effects models to identify within family 
inequalities. Families in our sample are nuclear ones, consisting of full siblings whose parents do 
not have any children with other partners. Given the extreme low levels of both out-of-wedlock 
births and divorces in India, this restriction excludes almost no one. A within-family specification 
ensures that we do not confuse differences in human capital accumulation across families, which 
depend for example on family size, with within-family inequalities.  
In our first model, we aim to identify gender gaps that are due to within-household favoritism. Note 
that it is not enough to employ family fixed effects to achieve this. Fixed effects capture differences 
in unobserved preferences that matter for use of gender-biased fertility strategies, e.g. strength of 
son preferences and preferred family size: However, gender is endogenous within the family since 
the same family will use gender-biased fertility strategies differently depending on the gender of 
all previously born children. To estimate favoritism of boys we use the gender coefficients from 
within-family estimations in the sample of first-born boys’ families. Since families that already 
have a son have no reason to employ gender-biased fertility strategies, gender is exogenous in this 
sample.20  
(1)   
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∗ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3 ∗ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4 ∗ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏4𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝜋𝜋 + 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                                                          
19 Note, however, that the consequence of being born female in a family that has an eldest son might be different than 
it is in a family without sons. 
20 If gender is exogenous in first-born boy families it should not be systematically related to birth order, such that the 
inclusion of birth order controls should have no significant impact on the estimated female coefficient. Back of the 
envelope calculations of the difference in female coefficient with and without birth order controls, assuming no 
covariance between the regression coefficients, indeed indicate no significant difference.   
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The coefficient 𝛽𝛽1 will give us the impact of within-family favoritism of sons over daughters. We 
use linear sibship fixed effects regressions for all outcomes in our main within-family estimations. 
For the binary outcomes enrollment and private school we therefore estimate the linear probability 
model. Standard errors are always clustered at the sibship level. 
Our second model aims to identify a possible eldest son advantage. It uses a very simple and 
straightforward strategy: to add an eldest son dummy to a within-household estimation that controls 
for gender (female) and birth order (bo). Note that the eldest son dummy is not an interaction term 
since the eldest son could be of any birth order. We also control for a full set of age dummies and 
survey round. 
The model is 
(2) 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∗ 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3 ∗ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4 ∗ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5 ∗ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏4𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝜋𝜋 + 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the outcome of child i in sibship s at time t, 𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 is a full set of child age dummies, 
and 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖 is  a survey round dummy.  𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 are sibship fixed effects, which captures differences in family 
size, and all other time constant differences across families. Our coefficient of interest is 𝛽𝛽1, which 
informs us about whether eldest sons are favored on top and above any potential benefits they have 
from being male and of their specific birth order.  
Third, we aim to investigate the impact of gender-biased fertility strategies on within-household 
gender inequalities. For this purpose, a within-household model with an fbg interaction terms is 
used. The interest is on the coefficient of the interaction term between female and fbg. In essence, 
we use a difference-in-difference strategy where first-born boy families are used as the 
counterfactual without gender-manipulation strategies. We include a control for being first born, 
but no additional birth order controls. This is because later birth orders are endogenous and related 
to gender in families that apply gender-manipulation strategies. If birth order matters for education 
outcomes we still need to control for first births since these are systematically of different genders 
between the two types of families (even if gender of the first born is ex ante exogenous).  
(3)   
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𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∗ 𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖+𝛽𝛽3 ∗ (𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽4 ∗ 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝜋𝜋+ 𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝜋𝜋 + 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
Fourth, we aim to find the effects of gender-biased fertility on between-family gender inequalities. 
Do gender-biased fertility strategies imply that girls end up in families that invest less in children’s 
human capital? And what does this imply for aggregate human capital inequalities between girls 
and boys? Since human capital investment is not likely to be fixed, but to respond to child gender 
we cannot directly test if girls end up in families that invest less. If girls live in families that invest 
less in education, this could be either because girls ended up in types of families that invest less or 
because the families invest less when they have more girls. For the same reason, we cannot simply 
compare models with and without family fixed effects. The total between-family inequality will 
not only capture the fact that girls and boys end up in different types of families, but also responses 
in these families to child gender. 
We employ a two-step strategy. In the first step we test whether and how much gender-biased 
fertility strategies affect the types of families that girls and boys end up in. We do this by regressing 
a female dummy, an fbg family dummy, and an interaction term between these two dummies on 
family characteristics that are likely to matter for human capital accumulation. Again, first-born 
boy families can be seen as providing the counterfactual, not affected by gender-biased fertility 
strategies. 
(4) 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∗ 𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3 ∗ (𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝜋𝜋 + 𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 ∗
𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝜋𝜋 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 
where 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are family characteristics. We do not include birth order controls since these are 
endogenous to gender-biased fertility strategies. If the interaction term is statistically significant, 
gender-biased fertility strategies lead to systematic differences between the families that girls and 
boys end up in. If families with first-born boys do not employ gender-biased fertility strategies and 
if the dependent variable is predetermined, such that it cannot respond to child gender, the 
coefficient on the female dummy should not be statistically significant.  
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In the second step, we estimate the correlation between the family characteristics investigated in 
the first step and the education indicators (Eq. 5).  
(5)   𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Note that it is not important whether the family characteristic’s impact on the education outcome 
is causal or not for our purpose. If girls, for example, more often end up in families where parents 
have less education, they will on average fare worse than boys, whether the impact of parents 
education on the education outcome is causal or not. Since we are not likely to include all family 
characteristics that matter for children’s education investment and outcomes, we will estimate 
lower bounds.   
4. Results 
A. Favoritism towards sons in general 
To find exogenous gender effects, that are not affected by gender-biased fertility strategies, we 
consider the female dummy among later born children in first-born boy families. Table 4 and 5 
present the female and birth order effects in first-born boy families.  
Table 4: The effect of gender and birth order in families with first-born boys on indicators of 
education performance – coefficients from linear sibship fixed effects estimations 
 Completed 
grades 
Reading Writing Math HAZ 
Female -0.009 -0.113** -0.083 -0.152*** -0.081* 
 (0.043) (0.055) (0.063) (0.051) (0.043) 
Second born -0.583*** -0.162** -0.106 -0.233*** -0.265*** 
 (0.048) (0.067) (0.074) (0.062) (0.049) 
Third born -0.847*** -0.328*** -0.113 -0.348*** -0.475*** 
 (0.084) (0.098) (0.117) (0.096) (0.079) 
Fourth+ born -0.964*** -0.549*** -0.234 -0.566*** -0.935*** 
 (0.137) (0.145) (0.176) (0.141) (0.127) 
R2 0.68 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.05 
N 33,148 3,914 3,864 3,899 14,258 
Sibships 10,678 1,838 1,816 1,831 5,242 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy, and sibship fixed effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
 
Table 5: The effect of gender and birth order in families with first-born boys on educational 
investment – coefficients from linear sibship fixed effects estimations 
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 Enrolled Total hours Private Expenses 
Female -0.029*** -1.592*** -0.021*** -267.991*** 
 (0.008) (0.372) (0.007) (56.392) 
Second born -0.030*** -1.903*** -0.026** -439.443*** 
 (0.008) (0.391) (0.011) (83.020) 
Third born -0.021 -2.186*** -0.020 -564.831*** 
 (0.013) (0.645) (0.023) (138.506) 
Fourth+ born 0.004 -1.727* 0.004 -709.967*** 
 (0.022) (1.019) (0.046) (206.370) 
R2 0.14 0.12 0.01 0.16 
N 33,153 30,029 26,328 23,589 
Sibships 10,679 9,848 9,176 8,443 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy, and sibship fixed 
effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
 
Controlling for unobserved family characteristics and restricting the analysis to families that should 
not resort to gender-biased fertility strategies does make a difference to estimated female 
coefficients. The estimated female coefficients are smaller than in the descriptive estimations in 
Table 2. However, within-family favoritism matters - girls do face a disadvantage compared to 
boys of the same birth order even within families that are not expected to use gender-biased fertility 
strategies. This disadvantage is significant for all outcomes with the exception of Completed grades 
and Writing. The greatest reduction in the female effect is on completed grades and pecuniary 
investments.  
B. Directly testing favoritism towards the eldest son 
In this sub-section we investigate within-household favoritism of the eldest son. In the case of 
school performance and HAZ, the eldest son coefficient is statistically insignificant and generally 
small in magnitude. This indicates that the potential advantage that eldest sons have in these 
measures is explained by their birth order and gender. Similarly, eldest sons are not favored within 
households in terms of time investments. Eldest sons do, however, appear to be favored in terms 
of pecuniary measures of investment, over and above what their birth order and gender can explain. 
Eldest sons are 2.5 percentage points more likely to attend a private school than what their gender 
and birth order can explain, and families spend about 152 extra rupees on their education. In 
summary, eldest sons are favored in terms of pecuniary investment, but this does not translate into 
better school performance as measured here, and it does not remove the negative birth order and 
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female effects within families. Hence, favoritism towards the eldest son does not appear to be a 
main reason behind inequalities between the genders. 
Table 6: The effect of gender and birth order on indicators of education performance in models with 
an eldest son dummy – coefficients from linear sibship fixed effects estimations 
 Completed 
grades 
Reading Writing Math HAZ 
Eldest son 0.034 -0.012 0.031 0.045 0.001 
 (0.034) (0.044) (0.050) (0.043) (0.035) 
Female -0.031 -0.141*** -0.121** -0.176*** -0.096*** 
 (0.035) (0.044) (0.050) (0.041) (0.036) 
Second born -0.504*** -0.164*** -0.092* -0.179*** -0.235*** 
 (0.033) (0.044) (0.051) (0.044) (0.035) 
Third born -0.805*** -0.294*** -0.121 -0.321*** -0.448*** 
 (0.056) (0.071) (0.086) (0.070) (0.060) 
Fourth+ born -0.931*** -0.402*** -0.221* -0.521*** -0.788*** 
 (0.093) (0.107) (0.119) (0.101) (0.095) 
R2 0.68 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.05 
N 69,514 8,578 8,478 8,545 31,002 
Sibships 21,453 3,993 3,947 3,977 11,046 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy, and sibship fixed effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
 
Table 7: The effect of gender and birth order on educational investment in models 
with an eldest son dummy - coefficients from linear sibship fixed effects estimations 
 Enrollment Hours Private Expenses 
Eldest son 0.006 0.224 0.025*** 151.779*** 
 (0.006) (0.310) (0.006) (56.270) 
Female -0.031*** -1.604*** -0.032*** -380.594*** 
 (0.006) (0.309) (0.006) (47.901) 
Second born -0.027*** -1.768*** -0.008 -279.134*** 
 (0.006) (0.273) (0.008) (60.291) 
Third born -0.029*** -2.413*** -0.006 -356.590*** 
 (0.009) (0.444) (0.014) (93.112) 
Fourth+ born -0.018 -2.492*** -0.011 -504.566*** 
 (0.014) (0.700) (0.025) (140.058) 
R2 0.15 0.12 0.02 0.15 
N 69,523 63,064 55,620 49,962 
Sibships 21,454 19,852 18,630 17,190 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy, and 
sibship fixed effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
 
19 
 
C. The impact of gender-biased fertility strategies on gender inequalities within 
families  
We here investigate the impact of gender-specific fertility stopping on inequalities between girls 
and boys using an interaction between the indicator that a child is in a first-born girl family (fbg) 
and the female indicator. 
In terms of education performance, the effect of being female in a family where the first-born is a 
girl is always negative, and in some cases relatively large, but is not statistically significant. In the 
case of human capital investment, girls in families with first-born girls once again exhibit more 
negative female effects, and these effects are statistically significant in the case of pecuniary 
investments. Therefore, fertility strategies only have a significant negative impact on girls’ 
education in the case of pecuniary investments. The significantly more negative female effect in 
pecuniary investments may indicate that girls in first-born girl families more often face binding 
financial constraint.  
Table 8: The effect of gender in families with first-born girls versus first-born boys on indicators of 
education performance - coefficients from linear sibship fixed effects estimations 
 Completed 
grades 
Reading Writing Math HAZ 
Female -0.023 -0.091* -0.073 -0.144*** -0.072* 
 (0.041) (0.055) (0.063) (0.051) (0.043) 
Female*fbg -0.081 -0.058 -0.124 -0.019 0.020 
 (0.054) (0.072) (0.094) (0.078) (0.062) 
R2 0.68 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 
N 69,514 8,578 8,478 8,545 31,002 
Sibships 21,453 3,993 3,947 3,977 11,046 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy, and sibship fixed effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
 
Table 9: The effect of gender in families with first-born girls versus first-born boys on 
educational investment - coefficients from linear sibship fixed effects estimations 
 Enrolled Total hours Private Expenses 
Female -0.030*** -1.593*** -0.020*** -255.713*** 
 (0.008) (0.368) (0.007) (55.581) 
Female*fbg -0.002 0.110 -0.032*** -288.008*** 
 (0.011) (0.567) (0.011) (101.255) 
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R2 0.15 0.12 0.02 0.15 
N 69,523 63,064 55,620 49,962 
Sibships 21,454 19,852 18,630 17,190 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy, and sibship fixed 
effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
 
D. The impact of gender-biased fertility  on between household gender inequalities 
 
Do gender-biased fertility strategies create gender inequalities due to girls and boys ending up in 
different types of families? In table 10 below, we investigate if because of fertility strategies girls 
are born in to families that differ from those that boys are born in to with regard to family 
characteristics that matter for education investment and performance. We consider mostly 
predetermined characteristics such as parents’ education, religion and caste. Urban residence and 
total household income is also likely to be largely predetermined. Sibship size is, however, likely 
to respond to child gender, through gender-specific fertility stopping behavior. Below are 
difference-in-difference estimates where the first difference is gender of the first-born and the 
second difference is gender of the child in question. The first-borns themselves are excluded from 
the analysis.  
 
Table 10: Differences in gender and family-type composition by family characteristics 
 Mother's 
education 
Father's 
education 
Poor Sibship size Ideal no 
children 
Female 0.042 -0.010 0.014 0.089*** -0.001 
 (0.074) (0.095) (0.009) (0.029) (0.021) 
Fbg family 0.169* 0.241* -0.006 0.101** -0.042 
 (0.098) (0.126) (0.013) (0.042) (0.036) 
Female*fgb  -0.183* -0.161 0.026* 0.241*** 0.117*** 
 (0.106) (0.135) (0.014) (0.042) (0.032) 
R2 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.01 
N 40,283 37,886 40,502 40,506 37,728 
 Urban SC/ST OBC Brahmin Muslim 
Female -0.005 0.008 -0.007 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.004) (0.007) 
Fbg family -0.002 0.013 -0.016 0.005 -0.034*** 
 (0.009) (0.015) (0.014) (0.005) (0.009) 
Female*fgb  0.005 0.006 0.008 -0.009* 0.012 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.005) (0.009) 
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R2 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 40,449 40,449 40,449 40,449 40,506 
Note: The estimations also include a constant and a full set of child age dummies.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
 
Results suggest that gender-biased fertility strategies result in important differences in the families 
that boys and girls end up in. In first-born girl families, boys on average end up in families with 
better-educated mothers than girls, and more often in higher caste families. Boys less often end up 
in poor families and in families where the mother express a stronger preference for many children. 
They also end up in smaller families. Girls end up in larger families than boys even in the first-
born boy families, and first-born girl families are in general larger than first-born boy families.  
 
What are the implied gender inequalities of the fact that girls and boys live in different types of 
families? In tables 11 and 12 below the family characteristics are regressed on education indicators. 
Coefficients from table 10 and tables 11-12 can then be used to predict resulting gender inequalities 
in education outcomes. These are displayed in table 13.  
 
Table 11: Correlations between family characteristics and indicators of education performance – coefficients 
from a linear regression. 
 Completed 
grades 
Reading Writing Math HAZ 
Poor -0.151*** -0.178*** -0.151*** -0.175*** -0.264*** 
 (0.036) (0.028) (0.032) (0.027) (0.037) 
Urban 0.128*** 0.113*** 0.092*** 0.166*** 0.086*** 
 (0.026) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.030) 
Mother’s edu 0.048*** 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.020*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Father’s edu 0.060*** 0.031*** 0.017*** 0.029*** 0.008** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
SC/ST -0.197*** -0.072** -0.113*** -0.116*** -0.137*** 
 (0.044) (0.032) (0.033) (0.031) (0.045) 
OBC -0.080** 0.027 -0.088*** -0.035 -0.074* 
 (0.033) (0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.042) 
Brahmin -0.115** 0.097* -0.041 0.051 -0.063 
 (0.050) (0.052) (0.051) (0.060) (0.065) 
Muslim -0.367*** -0.049 -0.025 -0.052 -0.008 
 (0.043) (0.034) (0.036) (0.037) (0.051) 
Sibship size -0.155*** -0.063*** -0.068*** -0.057*** 0.015 
 (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) 
Ideal no. kids -0.120*** -0.071*** -0.019 -0.053*** -0.045** 
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 (0.023) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.018) 
R2 0.72 0.17 0.12 0.18 0.03 
N 24,686 12,469 12,377 12,419 16,962 
 
Table 12: Correlations between family characteristics and measures of current education investment – 
coefficients from a linear regression. 
 Enrolled Total hours Private Expenses 
Poor -0.033*** -3.062*** -0.109*** -1,212.642*** 
 (0.007) (0.352) (0.008) (60.502) 
Urban 0.008* 1.483*** 0.211*** 1,672.406*** 
 (0.004) (0.291) (0.008) (124.337) 
Mother’s edu 0.005*** 0.387*** 0.007*** 221.107*** 
 (0.001) (0.038) (0.001) (19.901) 
Father’s edu 0.012*** 0.595*** 0.014*** 127.422*** 
 (0.001) (0.037) (0.001) (12.663) 
SC/ST -0.013* -1.288*** -0.061*** -885.157*** 
 (0.007) (0.443) (0.010) (136.701) 
OBC -0.002 0.334 0.018** -632.142*** 
 (0.006) (0.364) (0.009) (149.363) 
Brahmin 0.011 -0.546 0.071*** 76.008 
 (0.007) (0.626) (0.019) (282.633) 
Muslim -0.054*** -3.738*** -0.009 -398.210*** 
 (0.009) (0.452) (0.010) (144.952) 
Sibship size -0.011*** -0.970*** 0.002 -164.953*** 
 (0.002) (0.137) (0.003) (36.179) 
Ideal no. kids -0.019*** -1.513*** 0.000 -100.038** 
 (0.004) (0.214) (0.004) (45.662) 
R2 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.19 
N 24,686 23,395 22,964 18,817 
 
Table 13: Lower bounds on gender inequalities due to girls and boys ending up in systematically different 
types of families 
 Completed 
grades 
Reading Writing Math HAZ 
Later-born female in 
fbg family -0.079 -0.040 -0.033 -0.037 -0.014 
 Enrolled Total hours Private Expenses  
Later-born female in 
fbg family -0.009 -0.699 -0.006 -152.709 
 
 
 
Note that the gender inequalities in table 13 are lower bounds, since we might miss important 
family characteristics. Later-born girls in first-born girl families do face a disadvantage on all 
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outcomes as compared to boys in first-born girl families. For most outcomes the inequalities are 
between 1/6 and 1/3 of the descriptive total inequalities between girls and boys in Table 2 (about 
1/6 for HAZ and private school enrollment, 1/5 for math scores, 1/4 for writing scores and 
enrollment, 1/3 or more for reading writing scores, hours, and rupees spent on education). The 
disadvantage is, however, smaller than the within-household disadvantage that girls face (in tables 
5 and 6) for all outcomes except completed grades.  
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
We show that son preferences create inequalities in education investment and outcomes between 
girls and boys in several ways. The most straightforward way is favoritism of boys within the 
family. In a context where some families use gender-specific fertility stopping rules or sex selective 
abortions, gender is not exogenous and within-family discrimination cannot be estimated by simply 
adding family fixed effects. To estimate a gender effect that is due to within-family favoritism only 
we use a within-family model on a sub-sample that is unlikely to use gender-biased fertility 
strategies: families with first-born boys. Favoritism towards sons within the family turns out to be 
the quantitatively most important way in which son preferences create gender inequalities in 
education. Boys are clearly favored over girls.  
Eldest sons have been suggested to be particularly favored in Indian families. We estimate the 
advantage that eldest sons enjoy on top and above the advantage of their gender and birth order. 
Eldest sons in particular are favored with regard to private school enrollment and education 
expenses, but not for other outcomes. For the probability of private school enrollment, their extra 
advantage is larger than that of boys in general (which they also enjoy), while it is smaller for 
education expenses.   
Gender-specific fertility stopping rules can lead to within-family inequalities, especially for early-
life investments, while sex-selective abortions might instead work to reduce within-family 
inequalities. To identify the impact of gender-biased fertility strategies on education indicators we 
compare the impact of being a girl in a sub-sample that is likely to use gender-biased fertility 
strategies (first-born girl families) with a sub-sample that is not likely to do so (first-born boy 
families). We find that gender-biased fertility strategies create additional gender inequalities with 
regard to the probability of private school enrollment and education expenses, but not for other 
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indicators. A possible reason is that families that end up larger due to gender-specific fertility 
stopping rules face more binding resource constraints and prioritize boys. Perhaps surprisingly 
given the literature that has found impacts of gender-specific fertility stopping on early-life health 
investments, we do not find that gender-biased fertility strategies create gender inequalities in 
height for age among school-aged children. We also find no impacts on test scores, grade 
completion and enrolment. 
Both gender-specific fertility stopping rules and sex-selective abortions, and in particular their 
combination, could result in girls ending up in systematically different types of families than boys. 
Gender-specific fertility stopping rules imply that girl will on average live in families that ended 
up larger,  which might results in less human capital investment for all children in the family. Sex-
selective abortions tend to be used more often by better-off families, increasing the share of boys 
in these-better off families. The total between-family inequality will not only capture the fact that 
girls and boys end up in different types of families, but also the human capital investment responses 
in these families to child gender. To get at least a lower bound on between-family education 
inequalities between boys and girls that can be attributed to gender-manipulation strategies, we use 
a two-step procedure. In the families that use gender-manipulation strategies, i.e. first-born girl 
families, we first estimate if there are systematic differences in the types of families that girls and 
boys live in with regard to family characteristics that matter for education investment and 
performance. We thereafter estimate the association between these family characteristics and the 
education indicators. While girls do more often end up in families with worse outcomes on the 
education indicators, the implied inequalities are generally smaller than those due to within-family 
favoritism of boys.  
Gender-biased fertility strategies have been shown to have significant effects on a range of early-
life outcomes (Barcello et al., 2014; Jayachandran and Pande, 2017), and the large number of 
missing and unwanted girls in India is a tragedy. We show, however, that gender-biased fertility 
strategies have limited consequences on education inequalities between boys and girls in 
comparison to unequal treatment within the family (that is not due to gender-biased fertility 
strategies). Families might have good reasons to invest more in boys than in girls (Kumar, 2013; 
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Rosenblum, 2017).21 Independent of the underlying reasons, favoritism towards boys implies that 
Indian girls and Indian boys do not have equal education opportunities. Favoritism towards boys 
within the family thus provide a rationale for corrective policies favoring girls of all backgrounds, 
not only focusing on household characteristics. 
Compliance with ethical standards 
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21 A thorough investigation of the underlying reasons behind within-household favouritism of sons is beyond the 
scope of this paper. However, the geographical variation in within-household favouritism is not correlated with 
geographical differences in returns to education between women and men (available from the authors on request).  
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Table A1: Differences in means – children up to age 17 
 First born girl family First born boy family  
 N Mean N Mean diff 
Mother’s age 8,691 30.99 8,900 30.76 0.23 
Father’s age 7,705 35.70 7,919 35.40 0.30* 
Mother’s education 8,751 5.44 8,954 5.46 -0.02 
Father’s education 7,751 7.16 7,959 7.24 -0.08 
Brahmin 8,681 0.04 8,880 0.04 -0.001 
Other Backward Class 8,681 0.43 8,880 0.43 0.000 
Scheduled Caste/Tribe 8,681 0.31 8,880 0.30 0.01 
Muslim 8,774 0.13 8,977 0.14 -0.004 
Urban 8,693 0.27 8,901 0.27 -0.007 
 
